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1.  Introduction 
In a capitalist economy where private ownership of business is a characteristic feature, the  
firm can be defined as an organization that  conduct business activities  and  is owned and 
controlled by the same person(s). Even if ownership is shared across several persons and/or 
institutions, as in the case of public companies, the presence of a unitary control of the business 
activities by a few persons who constitute the top management  is easy to detect.
1
When this notion is applied to the analysis of actual firms, the boundaries thus identified 
do not always  coincide with the legal  entity (i.e. the company), which is normally used in 
empirical and theoretical studies to identify firms. This is due to the widespread presence of 
business groups: sets of companies that are legally distinct, but which are owned and controlled 
by the same person(s). This may be an individual, members of one family or a coalition of people,  
who are referred to as the ‘ultimate owner’, ‘vertex’ or ‘controlling owner’ of the group. 
  Thus, 
ownership and control are the main features of the firm’s boundaries. 
2
There are several definitions of a business group proposed in the literature. The main 
difference lies in the ‘nature’ of the relationships among the units comprising the group, the most 
important distinction being between ownership and non-ownership links. In the case of 
ownership, belonging to a group is determined by a majority share – or a stake large enough to 
secure control – held by one person or a coalition of people (the controlling owner). In the case 
of non-ownership links, the literature proposes several forms of stable connections that result in 
business groups: subcontracting, franchising, alliances, etc. (Menard, 2004). In general, the 
economics literature considers ownership ties, while the sociology and management literature 
 
                                                 
1 Public companies are significantly present only in the large firm sectors of the UK and USA; in all other countries 
concentration of ownership and control prevail (La Porta et al., 1999; Morck, 2000). 
2 The last term is used in this paper to refer to ownership. 1 
 
focuses also on non-ownership ties (Goto, 1982; Granovetter, 1994, 1995). Although we do not 
deny that forms of stable collaborations, such as those observed in vertical chains, can influence 
the behavior of firms, in this paper the group (or the business group) is identified on the basis of 
ownership and control relationships. 
Based on this perspective, we suggest that the business group rather than the individual 
company is the most appropriate ‘unit’ for an analyses of the organization and behavior of firms. 
The first authors to dealt with this issue (Penrose, 1959; Williamson, 1975) had some doubts 
about considering the business group as a firm. These doubts were based on the fact that both 
authors considered the presence of administrative (hierarchical) links and economic synergies as 
necessary conditions for identifying firm boundaries. According to Penrose: “although many 
industrial firms are more or less loosely bound together by a common source of finance or a 
strong element of common ownership, the mere existence of such connections is not of itself 
sufficient evidence that administrative coordination is effective and adequate enough to justify 
calling such a grouping a firm.” (Penrose, 1959, p. 21). 
In Penrose’s view the critical distinction is  between administrative coordination and 
‘mere’ ownership relations. Notwithstanding the difficulties in ‘operationalizing’ this distinction, 
empirical  evidence shows that business groups normally satisfy the conditions  suggested by 
Penrose for the identification of firm boundaries: that is, the presence of a unitary direction and 
administrative co-ordination. This is especially true in the case of small and medium-sized groups 
where these elements are more evident. 
The question of whether the firm is the business group or the legal unit is specifically 
relevant given the fact that business groups are not peculiar only to certain industries, countries 
or size classes. They are the organizational form typically adopted by entrepreneurs and managers 2 
 
to maintain and expand their control over business activities.
3
The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate that it is the business group rather than the 
individual legal unit that is most suited to a study of the behavior and organization of firms; that 
is, the business group rather than the individual legal unit is the most appropriate firm boundary. 
We analyze the internal control mechanisms of business groups, emphasizing notions such as 
unitary direction and administrative co-ordination.  
  This  preference has been 
reinforced by the trend in organization design since the 1970s towards enhancing the operative 
autonomy of organizational units in response to the increasing segmentation of markets. In this 
context the group has emerged as an organizational form specifically adapted to coping with the 
new conditions of markets and technology (Gerlach, 1997). Indeed, the legal autonomy accorded 
to the units of the group allows entrepreneurs and managers to implement an appropriate mix of 
control and autonomy to manage a set of different businesses. The group form also allows better 
control of the risks associated with investment in new activities.  
Given our aims in this contribution we adopt an interdisciplinary perspective that relies 
on economics, management and law. This multidisciplinary approach is necessary for analyzing 
the different aspects characterizing business groups in terms of ownership, control, economic 
synergies between firms and internal organizational mechanisms. To support our propositions, 
we use data and information from various sources, ranging from official statistics on the firms 
population, to sample surveys, case studies and juridical evidence. The use of different sources is 
justified not only by the interdisciplinary nature of the problem but also by the lack of systematic 
statistical evidence on the phenomenon of business groups. Most of the empirical evidence 
exploited in the paper refers to groups located in Italy based on the availability of statistics 
appropriate to the aims of this research. In fact, the Italian statistics agency (ISTAT) is one of the 
few  statistics offices to  produce systematic data  on the populations  of business groups. In 
                                                 
3 The exception to the widespread presence of business groups seems to be the US economy, where the M-form is 
prevalent (Chandler, 1982). This is generally justified by differences in fiscal regimes and corporate law (Morck, 
2003).  3 
 
response to the concerns raised by some Italian researchers at the beginning of the 1990s over 
the presence of business groups (Brioschi et al., 1990; Barca et al., 1994), information on groups 
has become part of the main surveys on Italian business activities. Though the Italian context 
presents specific economic and social features, the widespread presence of business groups is not 
a phenomenon that is peculiar to Italy, as we show in Section 3. Nor are there reasons to suppose 
that the characteristics of business groups and the general motives for their formation differ 
between the Italian context and other countries. For these reasons we believe that our results can 
be generalized to other social and economic contexts. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a synthesis of the literature on 
business groups. In Section 3 we present some empirical data on the relevance of business groups 
in developed and emerging countries and develop a taxonomy of this organizational form. In 
Section 4 we propose and discuss our hypothesis that the group is the appropriate unit to delimit 
the boundaries of the firm. Section 5 concludes the paper.    
 
2.  Related literature 
Most of the literature on business groups focuses on large, pyramidal groups. These are 
large complexes of several layers of controlled companies, with a holding company at the top 
(Morck and Yeung, 2003). There are two broad strands of literature. The first refers to emerging 
countries and considers business groups as resulting from the institutional conditions of these 
countries. Specifically, it sees the group as the result of inefficient market institutions. The second 
considers the group as a financial device used by individuals (families) who are at the vertex of 
the control chain. Within this approach, three different perspectives can be identified according 
to the issue being emphasized. We label them: i) equity leverage; ii) tunneling; and iii) internal 
capital market. The first two (equity leverage and tunneling) are appropriate for groups that 4 
 
include listed companies; the third refers to pyramidal groups in general, irrespective of their size 
or the presence or not of listed companies. 
2.1 The groups as a result of market failures 
This strand of the literature explains the presence of business groups as an organizational 
form suitable for the management and development of business activities in the specific 
economic, social and political conditions of emerging countries. A synthesis of the contributions 
regarding the nature of business groups in these countries was proposed by Khanna and Palepu 
(1997) and Khanna (2000). These studies interpret the presence of business groups as the result 
of the absence of or deficiencies in the institutions that facilitate an efficient enterprise system: i) 
the underdevelopment of financial markets; ii) high levels of institutional uncertainty and lack of 
discretionary power in  private enterprises and public institutions; iii) high level of political 
instability; iv) underdeveloped intermediate product markets. According to this interpretation 
“highly diversified business groups can be particularly well suited to the institutional context in 
most developing countries. … [they]  can add value by imitating the functions of several 
institutions that are present only in advanced economies” (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, p. 41). 
Peng and Delios (2006, p. 399) state that “in general, business groups and conglomerates 
are creatures of institutional imperfections”. Similarly, Chang (2006b) with specific reference to 
East Asian countries argues that:  
“Business groups are creatures of market imperfections, government intervention, and socio-cultural 
environments. I expect that as long as markets, especially capital markets, are imperfect and the East Asian 
governments influence resource allocation, business groups will continue to exist and even prosper in this region. 
As markets become more efficient and government intervention subsides, business groups may lose their reason 
for existence and see their influence decline”.  
 
According to this view, business groups should occur most frequently and most 
profitably in countries where market inefficiencies are prominent, usually emerging countries with 
significant market information asymmetries (Kock and Guillen, 2001; Yiu et al., 2005). However, 5 
 
this interpretation is contradicted by the large presence of business groups in advanced 
economies, an increasing rather a decreasing trend in recent decades.  
2.2 The group as a financial device 
Studies of business groups in developed countries stress the interpretation of the group as 
a financial device to separate ownership and control: that is, to separate control rights and cash-
flow rights. In the UK and the USA the development of stock markets has favored the 
establishment of public companies under managerial control (Barca and Becht, 2001); in 
continental Europe the group structure has allowed banks, families or the state to maintain 
control of large firms (La Porta et al., 1999). In public companies the main instrument for 
monitoring managers and limiting their discretionary power is the stock market, through the 
contestability of control. In the case of business groups, the control of companies is granted by 
forms of negotiated relationships among the main stakeholders (owners, banks, managers), which 
ensure more stable control. According to this interpretation business groups accomplish two 
main functions: i) they guarantee the stability of control (reduce contestability); ii) they maximize 
the activities controlled with a given amount of equity capital invested by the controlling owner. 
Daems’s (1978) work on the main Belgian groups was one of the first studies to interpret 
the group as a way of securing efficiency and stability in the control of business activities. Daems 
pays specific attention to the main financial holdings defined as “financial institutions which 
manage a portfolio of stocks in order to control the companies in which they hold a share of the 
equity capital” (Daems, 1978, p. 2). The crucial point in this definition is the notion of control, 
which justifies the existence of the group. By control Daems means the possibility of monitoring, 
and therefore influencing, the allocation of capital by the controlled businesses. By assuming this 
function the holding company replaces the ‘visible hand’ of managerial control with the ‘visible 
hand’ of an internal capital market. At the same time, the group requires a developed capital 6 
 
market to raise the capital necessary to gain control of subsidiaries.
4
The analogy of the group form to the multidivisional organization (M-form) has led some 
researchers to investigate the role of the pyramidal group in collecting and allocating to  its 
companies financial resources (similar to the central direction in a multidivisional firm). Several 
researchers have investigated the nature and consequences of the group as an internal capital 
market. Buzzacchi and Pagnini (1994, 1995)  try  to assess the amount of financial resources 
managed within the group (internal capital market) and the allocation efficiency of this internal 
market. In the first of their studies of a sample of 510 large industrial firms, they show that the 
amount of resources intermediated within the group is comparable to the financial resources 
raised by the group from external sources. This confirms the similarity between the group and 
the multidivisional firm in terms of the former’s role as a mechanism for the allocation of 
financial resources. However, the group multiplies the sources of external finance, since capital 
(debt and equity) can be raised by both the holding company and the individual firms in the 
group. It is this feature, according to Buzzacchi and Pagnini (1995), that may generate 
inefficiencies in the allocation process because of the presence of ‘tunneling’. This is impossible 
 The presence of groups is 
justified by the fact that the resource allocation mechanism guaranteed by the holding company is 
more efficient than that of the capital market. From a theoretical point of view, in a perfect 
capital market there would be no need for intermediation. The existence of the holding company 
can be justified, therefore, on the basis of two elements: i) the existence of imperfections in the 
capital market (information, transaction and monitoring costs), which render convenient both 
portfolio diversification and the active management of shares by the holding company; ii) the 
existence of advantages deriving from the direct control of businesses. According to Daems it is 
this second element that is important in explaining the presence of groups.  
                                                 
4 “By acting as a financial intermediary in the capital market, the holding company becomes similar to a closed 
mutual fund. The basic difference is that holding companies strive for control over corporate decision-making” 
(Daems, 1978, p. 3). 7 
 
in the case of multidivisional firms since individual shareholders have the same shares in all the 
activities (divisions) of the firm.  
Studying the ownership structures of groups and the conflicts of interest between control 
and minority shareholders, has intrigued those authors who interpret the group as being a 
mechanism for separating ownership and control. The first systematic study to adopt this 
perspective was by Brioschi et al. (1990), who examined the ownership and control structures of 
the pyramidal groups listed on the Italian stock exchange. Their interpretation of business groups 
is set out clearly in the introduction to their book: 
even if the importance of the group as an organizational form of enterprise midway between the market 
and hierarchy cannot be denied, it is necessary to recognize explicitly that the group phenomenon, in its 
hierarchical form, is essentially linked, for causes and effects, to the separation between ownership and control … 
following Hilferding‘s hypothesis, the group form is seen as the answer to the problem of controlling the widest 
range of activities with limited capital. (Brioschi et al., 1990, pp. 21–22, our translation)5
 
 
A similar conclusion is reached by Barca et al. (1994) in a study in the early 1990s of the 
Bank of Italy. In this and subsequent work, the pyramidal group is seen as a mechanism for 
separating ownership and control: 
By spreading the voting rights of minority shareholders out over a large number of firms, and 
concentrating those of the entrepreneur in the company at the top of the pyramid, this model allows the latter to 
obtain the control over the largest possible amount of other people’s capital with the smallest possible amount of 
his own. (Barca, 1996, p. 14) 
 
In this interpretation the relationship between the group and the stock market is 
fundamental, because equity leverage is maximized when there is a large spread of shareholders in 
the companies controlled by the group. Securing control through pyramidal groups is beneficial 
to controlling owners as they can extract private benefits from control. Two such benefits are 
                                                 
5 Suppose 50% is enough to secure the control of a company. An 50% owner of company A, which in turn owns 
50% of company B achieves control of the latter, although the cash flow stake (corresponding to the capital invested 
in it) is only 25%. The cash flow rights of the controlling owner in the companies at the bottom of the pyramid 
(corresponding to the capital he/she has invested to control them) can be determined by  i
i
CFR s = Π  where si is the 
share of capital of the controlling owner in layer i of the pyramid. The control (or voting) rights in a company 
correspond to the direct share in that company. A measure of the separation between cash flow and control rights is 
the ratio between the latter and the former. In the example above the ratio is 2.  8 
 
particularly important: i) securing the stability of control by reducing the contestability of 
ownership through hostile takeovers; ii) diverting cash flows from firms in which the controlling 
owners have low cash flow rights to companies where they have higher cash flow rights. This 
second mechanism, generally referred to as ‘tunneling’, has attracted the attention of several 
researchers (Dewenter et al., 2001; Bae et al., 2002; Bertrand et al., 2002; Friedman et al., 2003). 
The conflict in business groups between controlling and minority shareholders is exacerbated by 
the fact that the controlling shareholders have interests in all the companies in the group while 
minority shareholders own shares in individual companies.  
The interpretation of the pyramidal group as a financial device used by controlling 
shareholders to maximize the activities under their control is appropriate for groups that include 
listed firms, and where there is significant divergence between control and cash flow rights. The 
empirical evidence shows that the majority of groups are comprised of unlisted companies and 
there is no significant divergence between control and cash flow rights (Franks and Mayer, 2001; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002).  
Starting from this premise, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005) propose a model that explains 
the presence of pyramidal groups even when the aim of the controlling shareholders is not that 
of separating ownership and control. Although the model proposes a more general explanation 
of pyramidal groups, it relies strongly on the assumption of poorly functioning capital markets 
and limited investor protection.
6
                                                 
6 Indeed, one of the predictions of the model is that business groups should be more widespread in developing countries with less 
developed capital markets and limited investor protection. 
  When capital markets are not well developed and investor 
protection is poor, established entrepreneurs are advantaged in setting up new firms even if 
novice entrepreneurs would have been more efficient owners. This is because established 
entrepreneurs can use the cash flow generated by their existing business, and the need to access 
capital markets is reduced. Strictly speaking, this financial advantage explains why established 9 
 
entrepreneurs are at an advantage in creating new companies. According to Almeida and 
Wolfenzon, the use of the pyramidal structure allows established entrepreneurs to maximize their 
resources for investment by attracting capital for the new company from outside investors. 
Moreover, the established entrepreneur can extract private benefits from controlling the new 
firm. 
Summing up, these two strands of literature identify the nature of business groups as a 
substitute for market mechanisms or as a financial device; but in so doing they undervalue the 
role and the implications of the business group as an organizational form of the firm. Moreover, 
in focusing on larger groups, this literature underestimate the presence and the relevance of 
business groups among small and medium sized firms.  
 
3.  Business groups 
3.1 Relevance  
In spite of the widely acknowledged importance of business groups in industrialized and 
emerging economies, there is a lack of systematic and comparable data on this phenomenon. 
Most national statistics agencies normally consider the legal unit and its sub-units (plants or 
establishments) as the appropriate entity for collecting firm data: thus, they neither recognize nor 
provide statistics for the group as an economic entity.
7
Among the major EU countries, France and Italy are two of the few that systematically 
collect data on business groups. According to a 1999 survey by INSEE, companies belonging to 
groups (controlled by either national or foreign companies) represented 60% of value added and 
  
                                                 
7 EU regulations on statistical units define the enterprise as “the smallest combination of legal units producing goods 
and services and constituting an autonomous economic entity”. However,  European national statistics agencies 
normally associate the enterprise (or firm) with the legal entity (sole proprietorship or company). Indeed, a European 
Commission survey states that “the fact of observing an enterprise gives no information about whether it forms part 
of a group of enterprises. … Regrettably, groups of enterprises do not currently figure in the business statistics of 
many Member States” (European Commission, 2001, p. 191). 10 
 
50% of employment in France (Skalitz, 2002). In the 1990s the number of groups in France 
soared, thanks to the increased number with less than 500 employees (Vergeau and Chabanas, 
1997; Loiseau, 2001). According to more recent INSEE statistics, business groups account for 
almost 8 million employees, representing some 56% of total employment (excluding the financial 
sector). There are more than 30,000 groups with less than 500 employees (defined by INSEE as 
micro-groups), employing more than 2 million people (Table 1).  
Table 1 – Business groups in France by class of employees (excluding financial and agricultural 
sectors), 2005 













      thousands    billions   billions  
Micro groups : 1 - 499   32,668  94.8  2,105  26.9  528  201 
Small groups : 500 – 1,999   1,316  3.8  1,194  15.3  309  155 
Medium groups : 2,000 - 9,999   399  1.2  1,477  18.9  468  263 
Large groups :  ≥ 10,000   84  0.2  3,051  39.0  969  981 
Total  34,467  100  7,827  100  2,274  1,600 
(1) Only employees working in France are considered 
(2) The size classes of business groups and their definition are those adopted by INSEE 
Source: INSEE (2006) 
Statistics on business groups are also available for Italy the latest referring to 2002 (Table 
2).  
Table 2 – Business groups in Italy (excluding agriculture), 2003 









1–19  38,045  63.4  239.2  4.7 
20–99  15,599  26.0  691.9  13.5 
100–499  5,016  8.4  1019.6  19.9 
500– 4,999  1,216  2.0  1,513.7  29.5 
≥ 5,000  87  0.2  1,658.6  32.4 
Total  146,876  100  1982,171  100 
Source: ISTAT (2006) 
 
Excluding the agricultural sector there are more than 50,000 groups in Italy, mostly small 
size (less than 500 employees). Although the numbers of employees in groups is much higher in 
France than in Italy, their weight in total employment is remarkably similar: employment in 11 
 
Italian business groups represents 56.5% of all joint stock company employment (ISTAT, 2005, 
p. 11).
8
For the North American countries, data from Statistics Canada are the most explicit in 
distinguishing between legal units and groups of companies under common control. Statistics 
Canada data are organized in the ICO (Inter Corporate Ownership) database and published 
quarterly. Of the more than 90,000 firms considered in the 1998 database about 80% were multi-
unit  firms (i.e. groups), the remaining 20% being single unit firms. Unfortunately the ICO 
database does not provide information on the size of firms; for this reason it is impossible to 
assess how the relevance of the phenomenon varies according to the size of the companies.  
 Although several surveys have been conducted on the phenomenon of business groups, 
there are no official statistics for other EU countries. This is not due to the unimportance of this 
phenomenon in these countries, but simply because it has not attracted the attention of scholars 
and national statistics agencies.  
The presence and characteristics of business groups in the Asian countries has received 
much attention in the literature, although the focus is almost exclusively on the large firm sector, 
and no general statistics are provided on the phenomenon (Chang, 2006a; Peng and Delios, 
2006). Business groups are a growing phenomenon in China (Keister, 2000), Korea (Choi and 
Cowing, 2002), and India (Khanna and Palepu, 2000)
9
                                                 
8 The two percentages are not exactly comparable given the slight differences in the composition of the numerators 
and denominators. 
 and the case of Japan has been studied in 
some depth. The organization of large Japanese firms is characterized by the presence of groups 
that are tied together in close networks  involving ownership, management and supply 
relationships  (Gerlach, 1997). Shimotani (1997, p. 24)  identifies three types of groups: i) 
corporate complexes (such as keiretsu); ii) corporate groups; and iii) subcontractors (networks of 
9 The presence and characteristics of business group in Asian countries were the subject of an issue of the Asia-
Pacific Journal of Management (Vol. 23, n. 4, 2006). 12 
 
suppliers). While the literature on Japanese firms focuses mainly  on the first and third of these 
three forms, it is corporate groups (i.e. pyramidal groups) that are the most widespread in Japan.
10
Notwithstanding the absence of systematic empirical data on the phenomenon of 
business groups, that are comparable in terms of definitions and statistical methodologies, the 
above analysis shows the relevance and the widespread presence of business groups in all 
countries, industries and firm size classes. 
 
3.2 A taxonomy 
Several classifications of business groups have been proposed in the literature. A first 
distinction can be made between pyramidal and joint groups (Goto, 1982). The former are similar 
to a multidivisional firm in which there is one or more layers of companies controlled by the 
same ultimate owner, either directly or through a holding company (cases A and B in Figure 1). A 
joint group is one in which several firms share minority cross-holdings (and have some common 
board members), which allows them to coordinate their strategies (case C in Figure 1). The latter 
are peculiar to the largest firms in Japan (Shimotani, 1997); however, it is not possible to identify 
unitary control in this type of group. For this reason in this paper we consider only types A and B 
where it is possible to identify common ownership and control. There are two basic ways in 
which ownership relationships in a business group can be organized. The most common case is 
where  the ultimate owner retains control over  several companies through majority share 
ownership in a holding company, which is at the top of one or more layers of these companies 
(case A in Figure 1). This is referred to as a pyramid or pyramidal group. In the other case the 
ultimate owner directly controls several companies through majority holdings in all of them (case 
                                                 
10 “Of the three types, the one that occupies the most central position is the corporate group, composed of a large 
number of subsidiaries and forming a fundamental unit of business enterprise” (Shimotani, 1997, p. 9). Corporate 
groups correspond to the definition of the business group used in our study: “The term ‘corporate group’ is used 
here  to identify the organic whole consisting of a parent company at the apex of a supporting cast of group 
companies, each linked to the parent by capital and operational ties. Virtually all major Japanese companies are 
organized in this corporate group form” (Shimotani, 1997, p. 9).  13 
 
B in Figure 1). This is sometimes referred to as a horizontal group (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 
2005). Horizontal groups occur mainly in the small business sector and, in most cases, they are 
the forerunners of a pyramidal group.  





































One of the main limitations in the literature on business groups is that they are often 
treated as a single phenomenon, their variety in terms of size and internal organization being 
ignored. For the purposes of this paper we distinguish between two types of groups, which we 
label portfolio and industrial groups.  
Portfolio groups are characterized by the fact that the companies forming them have no 
economic synergies  and  respond  to strategies  of conglomerate diversification. They include 
mainly the largest firms in a country, which seek to diversify their portfolio offerings, and benefit 
from a re-allocation of the financial resources of the companies in the group (internal capital 
market). Most of the work on business groups refers to this type of group. The main research 
question in this literature is whether the allocation of capital within a group is more or less 
efficient than its allocation by capital markets.  
To exemplify a portfolio group we consider the CIR group in Italy, controlled by the De 
Benedetti Family and listed on the Milan stock exchange (Figure 2).  14 
 



















Source: Group CIR website (www.cirgroup.it) 
 
The holding company (CIR) manages a portfolio of holding companies that control other 
companies related to their business. The role of the parent company is to allocate financial 
resources to different lines of business.
11
Portfolio groups have attracted the most attention from both empirical and theoretical 
research. The literature stresses the interpretation of this type of group as a financial device. 
However, the majority of groups are industrial groups. The characteristic feature of an industrial 
  Each of the companies  controlled by CIR  is an 
industrial group, since they control other companies belonging to the same industry. Thus, an 
industrial group can be considered a subsystem of a portfolio group. Another example of a 
portfolio group is the Bronfman family group analysed in Morck and Yeung (2003). 
                                                 
11 This was made clear in the letter sent to shareholders in 2006 from the President and CEO of CIR: “The main 
objective of our role in allocating investment capital has always been to continue to create value, and we do this by 
defining strategies and checking that business plans are being implemented in conjunction with the managers of the 
operating companies. Today we can say that we have completed our transformation from a traditional holding 
company into a modern Group able to create and sustain new businesses in high growth sectors following an 
investment logic of deep value in the long term” (source: CIR Annual Report 2006). 15 
 
group is the presence of economic synergies among the companies in the group. Companies 
within a group normally belong to the same industry or production filiere. They may cover 
different segments of the same market or different phases in the production chain (Cainelli and 
Iacobucci, 2007).  
Systematic evidence on these groups is not readily available. For the Italian case, we draw 
on the Capitalia survey, which periodically collects information on a representative sample of 
Italian manufacturing firms. Firms are asked whether or not they belong to a business group and 
if the answer is affirmative, they are asked about the internal organization of the group. 
According to the last Capitalia survey, referring to 2003, about two-thirds of small and medium 
sized business groups (those between 11 and 2500 employees) controlled companies belonging to 
the same industry. This dropped to 42.4% for groups with more than 2,500 employees. This 
confirms the prevalence of what we label industrial groups, especially in the case of small and 
medium sized groups. Moreover, even when the companies of the groups operate in different 
industries  there are usually economic synergies between companies in the form of vertical 
relations or shared activities (Cainelli and Iacobucci, 2009). The Capitalia survey included also a 
specific question about the presence of operative relations between the companies in the group; 
these exist in the large majority of mono-industry groups but also in groups operating in more 
than one industry (see Table 3).  
Table 3 – Operative relations between companies belonging to groups (1,271 groups) 
 
Presence of operative relations  
between companies 
The group is  
mono-industry  yes  No  Total 
Yes  90.4  9.6  100.0 
No  81.5  18.5  100.0 
Total  86.9  13.1  100.0 
Source: Capitalia, 2003 
 16 
 
As example of an industrial group is the Elica group, whose main company produces 
kitchen range hoods for domestic use and is listed on the Milan stock exchange (see Figure 3).  


















This company operates in the sector of electric motors, 







This company operates in a specialized segment of the 
hood sector, in particular in the restaurant channel.
Throughthis company, the Group intends to concentrate 
the production of products for the American markets
in Mexico
The company manages all Mexican staff, providing
services to ELICAMEX
The company aims to develop the important Japanese 
market, where high-quality products are sold
The company sells hoods in Germany through so-called 
“kitchen studios”.






This company produces electric motors and exhaust 
range hoods for domestic use.
Parentcompany ofthe group. World's 
largest manufacturer of kitchen range hoods 
for domestic use
 
Source: Elica Group Annual report 2008 
 
The companies forming the group operate in different geographic areas and specific 
segments of the kitchen range hood market – as in the case of Elicamex, Ariafina and Airforce – 17 
 
or produce goods and services for other companies in the group as in the case of Fime and 
Leonardo Services.    
Industrial groups are managed as unitary organizations to exploit the economic synergies 
among companies and to maximize scale and scope economies. The legal autonomy accorded to 
the different business units allows the entrepreneurs and managers controlling the groups to 
implement the most beneficial mix of autonomous and centralized business activities. 
In the case of small groups several studies show that they are an organizational form used 
by entrepreneurs to implement growth strategies and are designed and managed as a unitary 
strategic construct (Rosa, 1998; Iacobucci, 2002; Lechner and Leyronas, 2009). 
We can conclude then that business groups are widespread in all countries, industries, and 
firm size classes and should not be seen as an ‘anomaly’ resulting from market imperfections or 
specific institutional conditions. On the contrary, they should be considered as one of the 
organizational forms adopted by managers and entrepreneurs seeking to expand the activities 
under their control. Efficiency motives, associated with growth strategies and the management of 
diversified activities, are as important as overcoming market imperfections.     
 
4.  The business group as a firm  
From a theoretical point of view, the institutional economics literature gives the greatest 
emphasis to the problem of firms’ boundary and also specifically addresses the issue of the nature 
and internal organization of business groups. However, it is not unanimous about the group 
being the most appropriate unit to delimit the boundary of firms. The difficulty involved in 
considering the group as a firm is underlined, for example, by Penrose ( 1959, p. 20): 
The extensive and elusive lines of control in the modern business world … make it more difficult to 
decide what should be included within a given firm. The unincorporated individual proprietorship, the partnership 
and the small corporation without subsidiaries create in general no trouble, but the large corporation with many 
subsidiaries over which it exercises some degree of control does.  
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Williamson  (1975, p. 144)  considers the group (the holding form) to be a ‘loosely’ 
divisionalized structure that does not benefit from internal relationships among its divisions; 
these relationships are again associated with the legal boundaries  of  the  firm. Indeed, the 
transaction cost approach considers business groups as a hybrid organizational form, 
intermediate between the market and the hierarchical (internal) form of co-ordination (Goto, 
1982; Kester, 1992).  
What is common to these views is that they identify the presence of ‘administrative co-
ordination’ with a firm, this function being conducted typically within a legal boundary. For this 
reason, both Penrose and Williamson would not consider those groups in which there is a lack of 
administrative co-ordination between  legal units  to be firms.  Specifically,  Williamson  (1975) 
sustains that this administrative co-ordination is present in M-form organization but not in 
business groups. In contrast to this perspective, we consider that the forms of unitary direction 
and administrative co-ordination observed in business groups (especially, industrial groups) are 
similar to those characterizing the internal organization of firms.  
4.1  Unitary direction 
Our main point is that in business groups we observe forms of unitary direction which 
assimilate the group to the internal organization of what is generally referred to as a firm. In other 
words,  the business group is a decentralized organizational form that  resembles an M-form 
organization. It is not a case that Chandler (1982) interprets the M-form as the American style 
industrial group.  
Williamson ( 1975, p. 137) referring to the M-form organization underlines that:  
The characteristics and advantages of the M-form innovation can be summarized in the following way: 
1.  The responsibility for operating decisions is assigned to (essentially self-contained) operating divisions or quasi 
firms. 
2.  The elite staff attached to the general office performs both advisory and auditing functions. Both have the 
effect of securing greater control over operating division behaviour. 
3.  The general office is principally concerned with strategic decisions, involving planning, appraisal, and control, 
including the allocation of resources among the (competitive) operating divisions. 19 
 
4.  The separation of the general office from operations provide general office executives with the psychological 
commitment to be concerned with the overall  performance of the organization rather than become absorbed 
in affaires of the functional part. 
5.  The resulting structure displays both rationality and synergy: the whole is greater (more effective, more 
efficient) than the sum of the parts.   
 
This quote shows that the functions of the general office in the M-form is twofold: i) the 
definition of long run-strategies (such as the opening, closing or development of divisions) and 
the corresponding allocation of resources; ii) the monitoring and supervision of divisions and 
appointment (or removal) of the heads of divisions. In business groups these functions are the 
responsibility of the ultimate owner(s). In fact, ownership gives the right to appoint members to 
the boards of controlled companies, acquire or sell companies, allocate financial resources to 
them and monitor their performance (Demsetz, 1988; Hart and Moore, 1990). These control 
rights allow the ultimate owner to exercise unitary direction over the group: that is, to influence 
the  decisions taken  by  individual  companies on strategic issues  such as investment, vertical 
integration, financial structure, etc.  
Besides the control rights associated with ownership, unitary direction in business groups 
can also be proved by referring to corporate law. In fact, the unitary direction of the companies 
in a group is explicitly recognized by corporate law. For example, in German law the Konzernreckt 
(groups law) defines the concept of unitary direction (einheitliche leitung) as the possibility of 
determining  the long-term objectives and strategies of the  companies belonging to a  group 
(Rinaldi, 2008). Through the concept of unitary direction, this legal system identifies the legal 
responsibilities of individual companies by recognizing that they are part of a unitary strategic 
design. Also, in Italy, the recent (2003) reform of corporate law recognizes the presence of a 
unitary direction as a basis for the identification of a business group. Previously, the Supreme 
Court (n. 1439, 1990) stated that the relevance of unitary direction was that it was a characteristic 
of the business group and defined a business group as an aggregation of production units legally 
distinct but with organizational links, in pursuit of a common aim. Finally, there are several 20 
 
judgments by the Italian Court of Cassation that confirm the presence of a unitary direction in 
business that is exercised over the controlled companies by the ultimate owner (Rinaldi, 2008).  
4.2  Administrative co-ordination 
Unitary direction is also  exercised through forms of administrative co-ordination of 
controlled companies. According to Mintzberg (1989)  and  Radner  (1992), administrative  co-
ordination is achieved in three ways: i) mutual adjustments  in planning and implementing  
decisions ii) standardization of processes and procedures; and iii) direct supervision and authority.  
Case studies and empirical surveys conducted on business groups located in different 
countries, industries and size classes show that all these forms of co-ordination are observed in 
industrial groups (Guillen, 2000; Brioschi et al., 2004; Iacobucci, 2004). These studies show that 
mutual adjustment  and standardization  is also achieved through centralization  and joint 
management of activities and services, such as R&D, finance, etc.,  which  benefit all the 
companies in the group. The relevance of these organizational mechanisms is  supported by 
evidence from the Capitalia survey for the Italian case. The Capitalia survey asked companies 
belonging to business groups about the degree of autonomy in coordinating the main business 
functions: administration, finance, sales and marketing, R&D (see Table 4). Independence in the 
co-ordination of these functions was recorded by just under half of the companies surveyed; the 
rest declared complete centralization or some form of co-ordination managed by the head of the 
group. The presence of some form of control over the group by the management functions 
implies the presence of appropriate information systems and day-to-day involvement in the 






Table 4 – Groups by degree of autonomy in managing business functions  
 




Centralized management by the group  17.8  24.3  20.2  25.3 
Some autonomy by the controlled company  33.8  33.1  33.3  28.3 
Independence by the controlled company  48.4  42.6  46.5  46.4 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Capitalia, 2003 
 
Also, autonomy of the business function in controlled companies does not reduce the 
possibilities for the parent company selectively to intervene and influence the choices they make. 
It does not mean that, in this case, administrative co-ordination of the group is not operative; but 
simply that the ‘potential’ exist and can be activated any time that this is considered to be in the 
interests of the group.  
The supervision and authority exercised by the ultimate  owner are fundamental to 
considering the group as a firm. While authority is exercised through the forms of control rights 
already mentioned, supervision requires the development and implementation of ‘administrative 
systems’ that allow the ultimate owner to collect and elaborate information on the business 
activities of individual companies.  
In terms of accounting and financial reporting, the need for consolidated accounts 
requires groups to adopt standardized administrative procedures and accounting systems. This is 
achieved by implementing unified financial management and issuing a standard set of business 
statements, financial charts, and accounting rules to be used by all subsidiaries. All countries 
require companies controlling other companies to present consolidated accounts. At EU level, in 
1983 the European Community's Seventh Directive required member countries to introduce its 
legal definition of a group and the requirements for group accounts (Gray et al., 1993). Any 
company (parent company) that legally controls or exercises a dominant influence on another 
company (subsidiary company) has a duty to prepare consolidated accounts. In the subsequent 22 
 
years, this definition of the group and requirement for parent companies to produce consolidated 
accounts was adopted in the legal systems of member countries.  
In 1989, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) issued IAS 27 on 
consolidated accounts, setting the standards to be applied in the preparation and presentation of 
consolidated financial statements for a group of entities under the control of a parent. According 
to IAS 27, consolidated financial statements are the financial statements of a group presented as 
being for single economic entity. The identification of controlled companies (subsidiaries) is 
based on the notion of control, defined as the power to govern the financial and operating 
policies of an enterprise so as to obtain benefits from its activities. Control is presumed when the 
parent owns more than half of the voting rights of the enterprise. However, even in the case that 
there is a majority holding voting rights, control may be evidenced by power [IAS 27.13] which is 
present if one of the following condition is satisfied: i) power over more than one half of the 
voting rights by virtue of an agreement with other investors; ii) power to govern the financial and 
operating policies of the other enterprise under a statute or other type of agreement; iii) power to 
appoint or remove the majority of the members of the board of directors; iv) power to cast the 
majority of votes at a meeting of the board of directors. Consolidated accounts are almost always 
what matters to investors. 
In addition to these accounting principles, the spread of information systems, such as 
enterprise resource planning (ERP),  in business  groups  allows the controlling owner to 
standardize and automate core business processes, integrate financial accounting information, 
improve cost control and make financial planning more effective. This is supported by evidence 
from the main producers of ERP, such as SAP, Oracle and Microsoft, which report several cases 
of business groups implementing integrated systems to optimize co-ordination  and  gain 
enterprise-wide control over subsidiaries. The development of these information systems allows 
ultimate owners to improve, not only the exercise of their unitary direction over the controlled 
companies, but also their administrative co-ordination.  23 
 
5.  Conclusions 
A growing stream of empirical and theoretical research is highlighting the relevance of 
business groups in economic systems. Business groups are widespread in all countries, industries 
and firm size classes. Despite the increase in this phenomenon, the literature does not always 
acknowledge  the business group as  a specific organizational form; in most studies,  the  firm 
boundary coincides with the legal unit, that is, the company. This is mainly due to the availability 
of data since national statistics agencies tend to consider the legal unit and its sub-units (plants or 
establishments) as the appropriate level for the collection on firm statistics.  
Business groups have been studied from two main perspectives: i) as the result of market 
failure; ii) as a financial device. In this literature large groups are usually characterized by the fact 
that the companies that form them do not show economic synergies and respond to a strategy of 
conglomerate diversification. The first perspective considers the group as resulting from the 
specificity of the economic and institutional context of emerging countries. As a result, the 
importance of groups is expected to reduce as the economy develops towards more efficient 
market institutions. However, this interpretation is contradicted by the large and increasing 
presence of business groups in advanced economies. The other perspective considers the 
business group as a financial device, focusing on mechanism such as internal capital markets, 
tunneling and equity leverage. This approach undervalues the role of the group as an 
organizational form. Both these approaches are at odds with the growing amount of evidence 
showing that most groups are characterized by ownership of companies belonging to the same 
industries and unitary management to exploit the economic synergies among member companies. 
We label these ‘industrial groups’.  
Penrose  (1959)  and Williamson (1975)  were  among the first authors  to discuss the 
relationships between the firm boundary and the presence of business groups and developed 
notions of unitary direction and administrative co-ordination. Unitary direction can be defined as 24 
 
influence  over the decisions taken by the  controlled companies in  strategic  areas  such as 
investment, vertical integration, financial structure, etc. Administrative co-ordination is achieved 
through  the  development and implementation of administrative systems (such as business 
processes and information systems) that allow managers to exercise supervision and authority 
over controlled companies. 
Starting from these  contributions we show  that  forms of unitary direction  and 
administrative co-ordination are common in business groups; these forms can be assimilated to 
the internal organization of firms. For this reason we propose that the group rather than the 
individual company is the appropriate unit to delimit the boundary of the firm.  
The presence of unitary direction in business groups, and its implications for the behavior 
of  the  individual companies  in the group,  are  confirmed  by  considering the control rights 
associated  with  ownership  and by referring to corporate law.  Corporate law in  European 
countries recognize the existence of a unitary direction exercised by the ultimate owner on 
companies belonging to business groups but unitary direction can be exercised also through 
forms of administrative co-ordination of controlled companies. This co-ordination is achieved in 
different ways, such as mutual adjustment  in decisions planning and implementation, 
standardization of processes and procedures and direct supervision and authority. In this context, 
the role of EU regulation and international accounting standards for consolidated accounts play a 
relevant role. We show that in the majority of groups coordinating mechanisms are at work; in 
the other cases there is a ‘potential’ for these mechanisms which can be activated whenever this is 
considered to be in the interests of the group.  
The development of information and communication technology and the adoption of 
more efficient information systems are facilitating the  exercise of unitary direction and 
administrative co-ordination in business groups. In this sense, technology is playing a role in 
defining the boundaries of firms and affecting the ways in which business activities are organized 
in the real world.  25 
 
What are the empirical implications of considering the group as the unit of analysis? We 
suggest that this could have important consequences for the study of firm behaviour in areas 
such as investment, innovation and growth strategies. The presence of business groups shows 
that growth is achieved not only through expanding the original legal unit, but also by setting up 
new firms or acquiring established ones. This results in the formation of a business group and the 
organizational advantage of retaining the legal autonomy of each business unit. If the group form 
is not considered this risks an underestimate of the actual size of firms. Moreover, the group is 
the organizational form suited to  managing diversification and especially  vertical integration 
(Cainelli and Iacobucci, 2009); in fact, not considering business groups “... might underestimate 
the overall incidence of vertical integration by omitting integration accomplished through 
business group formation or expansion.” (Fan et al., 2009, p. 21).  
Our main conclusion is that not considering the business group underestimates the actual 
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